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Key Takeaways
•

Building on CCSI’s work, this paper sheds light on the legal, regulatory, and contractual provisions
that underpin shared-use mining infrastructure and provides non-exhaustive guidance on how
governments might strengthen provisions to advance shared use of railroads, ports, and power.

•

Legal provisions establishing the shared use of mining infrastructure in concessions should reflect
the legal and regulatory system in which they operate. Where there is little regulation of the mining
sector, provisions in concessions need to include objective indicators that establish preconditions
for shared use as well as explicitly identify each matter related to access, such as the right to build
infrastructure, ownership of infrastructure, third-party and governmental access to infrastructure,
priority use, user fees, and dispute resolution.

•

While ideally there should be an independent regulator with the authority to make final
determinations regarding shared-use disputes, in their absence, concessions should include legal
provisions that establish an alternative dispute resolution process that parties can undertake
before resorting to local tribunals or formal arbitration.

•

Legal provisions related to excess capacity need to contemplate how mining companies design,
construct, and operate infrastructure and who bears the cost of excess capacity, especially when
governmental or third-party use of the infrastructure depends on their non-interference with
companies’ operations.

•

Legal provisions should distinguish between bulk cargo, non-bulk cargo, and passenger services,
given the different economics of each service. Depending on the context, shared-use negotiations
could consider requiring open access to service roads, instead of rail.

•

When drafting legal provisions, governments should require that shared use will occur on a nondiscriminatory basis where the mining company will not abuse its economic position in dictating
terms of access. Enforceability will depend on shifting the burden of proof to companies and
ensuring that the regulatory body has auditing capacity.

•

Anticipating the economic viability of the conditions of shared use over a 20- to 30-year contract is
an impossible undertaking. As in any long-term contract-related issue, contract parties should
include periodic review clauses to regularly reassess the conditions of the contract.

1

Citations in this paper are meant to provide adequate information for readers to easily access referenced sources. Legal
citations do not uniformly follow the Bluebook.
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1

Introduction

Many developing countries face an infrastructure funding gap:2 the public sector is unable to finance
the construction of vital public works, such as railroads, ports, and power infrastructure. Extractive
industry investments in infrastructure can help to narrow the gap.3 Non-renewable resources serve as
a foundation to construct long-term infrastructure assets that support sustainable development.4 The
rub lies in the fact that mining companies have traditionally followed an “enclave model,” building
infrastructure for their exclusive use.5 Although mining infrastructure might eventually be owned by
the state, such as through a build–operate–transfer arrangement,6 the enclave model causes
governments to lose the opportunity to take advantage of synergies7 between the infrastructure and
larger national development plans.8 In turn, shared-use mining infrastructure leverages the investments
made in a mining operation’s infrastructure to expand benefits to national and regional communities. 9
This paper looks at legal provisions related to shared-use mining infrastructure to support governments,
the private sector, and communities in capitalizing on those synergies.
In 2011, CCSI began to research how mining infrastructure can be leveraged for sustainable
development and in 2013 created an economic, legal, and operational framework to generate shareduse benefits from rail, ports, power, water, and internet and telecommunications. 10 CCSI has published
many works on shared use in the mining sector. 11 Those works, along with other mining-related

2

See Perrine Toledano, Sophie Thomashausen, Nicolas Maennling, and Alpa Shah, A Framework to Approach Shared Use
of Mining-Related Infrastructure (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2014), 4,
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/our%20focus/A-Framework-for-Shared-use_March-2014.pdf
[hereinafter Framework].
3
Toledano et al., Framework, 4.
4
Toledano et al., Framework, 5.
5
Toledano et al., Framework, 5.
6
Toledano et al., Framework, 8–9.
7
Synergies are created through economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale are “economies that occur when the
cost per unit of output diminishes with increasing scale of the project as fixed costs are spread out over more units of
production,” and economies of scope “arise when the outputs of one type of infrastructure can be used as the inputs of
another type of infrastructure.” Toledano et al., Framework, 10.
8
Toledano et al., Framework, 5.
9
Toledano et al., Framework, 4.
10 Toledano et al., Framework.
11 Toledano et al., Framework; Perrine Toledano, Leveraging Extractive Industry Infrastructure Investments for Broad
Economic Development: Regulatory, Commercial and Operational Models for Railways and Ports (New York: Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment, 2012), https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/our%20focus/CCSIPolicy-Paper-Leveraging-Mining-Related-Rails-and-Ports-for-Development-May-20121.pdf [hereinafter Rail & Port Policy
Paper];
Perrine Toledano, Leveraging the Mining Industry’s Energy Demand to Improve Host Countries’ Power Infrastructure (New
York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2012),
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/our%20focus/CCSI-Policy-Paper-Leveraging-miningindustry%E2%80%99s-energy-demand-to-improve-host-country%E2%80%99s-power-infrastructure-Sept-2012.pdf
[hereinafter Power Policy Paper];
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Nicolas Maennling, Perrine Toledano, Edgar Santos Monteiro, and Felipe Botelho Tavares, SharedUse Infrastructure Along the World's Largest Iron Ore Operation: Lessons Learned from the Carajás Corridor (New York:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2020),
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/publications/CCSI-Shared-Use-Carajas-Corridor-Vale33MB.pdf [hereinafter Carajás Report].
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publications12 and mining concessions available online,13 ground the analytical framework of this paper,
provide insight on the economic drivers of the mining sector, and detail how legal provisions—including
laws, regulations, and contractual terms—can forefront shared use.
This paper is part of CCSI’s larger work on extractive industries which endeavors to make mining more
beneficial and sustainable for people, private enterprise, and the natural environment. It sheds light on
the legal, regulatory, and contractual provisions that underpin shared-use mining infrastructure and
provides non-exhaustive guidance on how governments might strengthen them to advance shared use
of railroads, ports, and power.
Section 2 provides background information on the basic legal frameworks that underpin shared-use
mining infrastructure. Sections 3 and 4 focus on the economic conditions and legal provisions that
shape the shared use of railroads, ports, and power. Section 5 concludes the paper by indicating areas
for further research.

2

Legal Frameworks Related to Shared Use and Mining

States have various legal methods to open mining infrastructure to third-party or governmental use,
and the legal provisions detailed in the next sections of the paper evidence the breadth of those
methods and their specific language. Before getting to the legal provisions themselves, it is important
to understand the basic legal hierarchies underpinning shared-use provisions and how a government
can regulate the market to address the shortcomings of the traditional enclave model of mining
infrastructure.
A constitution, statutes, and regulations create the general legal framework within which mining
companies and governments enter into mining contracts to extract minerals. Contracts do not operate
in isolation, but are negotiated and implemented in light of the constitution and the statutes and
regulations that govern the mining sector. That is, constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
requirements take precedence over the provisions within a specific contract, unless otherwise agreed
to by the national government, to the extent such agreements are lawful.14
A government can ideally choose from a variety of methods to encourage or mandate shared use—be
it through the passage of a nationwide statute that applies to all mining projects, or the inclusion of a
bundle of contractual terms within a single mining contract. The benefit of including shared use in
statutes is to present the conditions for investment transparently, giving an early signal to investors
that the government plans to enforce shared use. For instance, Brazil’s Law No. 8,987 governs criteria
and award processes for public service concessions.15 In Australia, the government legislated that

12

13

14
15

International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP), OpenOil, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), and Natural
Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them (ISLP, OpenOil, CCSI, and
NRGI, 2014), https://eiti.org/documents/mining-contracts-how-read-and-understand-them [hereinafter Mining
Contracts].
“ResourceContracts.org,” ResourceContracts.org (website), Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), World Bank Group, and Open Oil, http://www.resourcecontracts.org.
ResourceContracts.org is the largest online repository of publicly available oil, gas, and mining contracts. The site
currently holds more than 2700 extractives contracts and associated documents.
See ISLP et al., Mining Contracts, 142 (discussing the effects of “stabilization” or “freeze” clauses in mining concessions).
Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 79.
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infrastructure may become shared use when certain antitrust criteria are met.16 Even so, shared use
needs to be specified in contracts as the feasibility and necessity of shared use is very specific to the
project circumstances, such as the commodity type, the economic development of the region of
operation, and the presence of other mining investors.
In practice, contracts are the most common legal tool used to encourage or require shared use, as
developing countries frequently do not have a well-developed legal framework on shared use.
In this case, contract provisions should be very detailed and explicitly identify each matter related to
access,17 such as: the right to build infrastructure; ownership of infrastructure; third-party and
governmental access to infrastructure; priority use; user fees; and dispute resolution. The more explicit
a provision’s language is, the more successful parties will be in avoiding disputes related to shared use.

Ministries, Administrative Agencies, and Their Regulations
After a law that mandates shared use is enacted, or a specific contract requiring the creation of shareduse infrastructure is signed—or both—the role of the government in supporting shared use is not
complete. Achieving shared use is an ongoing process where legal, regulatory, and contractual
provisions need to be actively implemented and enforced. In particular, when the mining company
submits its mining development plan for approval, authorities have leverage to scrutinize the plan and
ensure that the mining infrastructure design anticipates shared use.18
While shared use can be supervised by a ministry of mines, governments can also create administrative
agencies tasked with regulating access to infrastructure across multiple sectors, such as Instituto
Nacional dos Transportes Terrestres (now Instituto Ferro-Portuário) in Mozambique.19 To reach its full
potential, the decision-making of an administrative agency needs to be independent and insulated from
political influence. An independent regulatory body is one where key personnel are not appointed by
an elected official and decision-making and dispute resolution regarding shared use is neutral and
trusted.20
After private negotiations fail, parties can file suit or submit to arbitration to try and enforce an
obligation for shared use, but both are time-intensive, costly methods. Moreover, while courts may not
always be the best equipped to handle a highly technical dispute regarding access to a railroad or port, 21
arbitration (and international arbitration in particular) can be even more problematic because of issues
and concerns including high litigation costs and a history of awards to private companies at the expense

16
17

18

19
20
21

See Toledano, Rail & Port Policy Paper, 17.
See Toledano et al., Framework, 45 (discussing regulation by contract); ISLP et al., Mining Contracts, 14 (discussing the
relationship of contracts and generally applicable law in awarding and managing mining concessions).
Tom Mitro, Who Influences Oil Sector Governance Outcomes? It Depends on When You Ask.
Understanding the Shifting Power Dynamics Across Companies, Communities and Host Governments over Project
Lifecycles and Their Implications (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2021),
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Who%20influences%20oil%20sector%20governance%20outc
omes_%20It%20depends%20on%20when%20you%20ask%20(5).pdf.
Toledano et al., Framework, 17.
See Toledano et al., Framework, 20–21, 27–28.
See Toledano, Rail & Port Policy Paper, 36.
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of public interests.22 Instead, national governments can create an alternative dispute resolution process
or require that a ministry or administrative agency interpret and implement legal provisions related to
shared use—settling disagreements before they need to be taken to a tribunal.

Contracts Between Private Entities
For third parties to access or use mining infrastructure, the mining company needs to enter into
additional agreements with third parties.23 Statutes, regulations, and legal provisions in the original
concession shape those agreements: what type of shared use is permissible, and on what terms. For
instance, the national government may require that excess electricity be produced but mandate that
the mining company only sell the power to a governmental entity. 24 Or a rail mining company might be
required to operate a certain amount of passenger trains each day, 25 but the government caps
passenger tickets at a certain price.26 Oftentimes, legal provisions both in investor–state contracts and
in contracts between the mining company and third parties relate to balancing the economic interests
of the mining company with accessibility. A primary issue for shared-use infrastructure is not just
access, but the affordability of access when there is the potential for a lead mining company to abuse
its economic power and implement discriminatory pricing. 27

3

Shared Use of Rail and Port Infrastructure

3.1

Context and Preconditions

As previously mentioned, a major issue facing shared-use infrastructure in the mining sector is the
traditional enclave model, where the transportation, electricity, water, and information and
communications technologies (ICT) elements of the project are designed and built exclusively for the
use of the mining company.28 Although the enclave model increases the reliability of a mining
operation, the model results in a lost opportunity for the government to take advantage of the
synergies between a mining company’s infrastructure investments and the economic development of
a region.29 Counteracting the market’s shortcomings, the government has a key role to play in creating
and managing shared-use infrastructure.30 But, before the government makes the decision to facilitate

22

23

24

25
26
27
28
29
30

Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Brooke Güven, and Jesse Coleman, Costs and Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practice
Considerations for States (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, March 2018),
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/our%20focus/Cost-and-Benefits-of-Investment-TreatiesPractical-Considerations-for-States-ENG-mr_0.pdf.
If another mining company is accessing the infrastructure for the transport of ore, the infrastructure is considered
“multi-user.” If third parties are using the infrastructure to transport goods such as agricultural products, fuel, or timber,
or to transport passengers, the infrastructure is “multi-purpose.” Toledano et al., Framework, 5.
Independent State of Papua New Guinea, “The Independent State of Papua New Guinea and [Blank] Standard Mining
Development Contract Draft,” Section 5.7, (2010),
https://www.mmdaproject.org/presentations/PNG%20Full%20Revised%20Standard%20MDC.pdf [hereinafter Papua
New Guinea Standard Mining Concession].
Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 83.
Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 84.
See Toledano et al., Framework, 8.
Toledano et al., Framework, 5.
Toledano et al., Framework, 5.
Toledano et al., Framework, 12.
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the construction and operation of shared-use infrastructure, there are several preconditions to take
into account.
For rail, the government first needs to consider if the “proposed development aligns with national and
regional infrastructure plans.”31 If the proposed railroad and port will be in a thinly-populated region,
with little foreseen future economic development, requiring shared use does not make sense when
public interests would be better served by higher tax revenues.32 If the region is or will tend to become
an economic corridor—because of multiple mining concessions in the region, existing or potential
downstream industries, population settlement plans, or land suitable for agriculture or forestry
surrounding the infrastructure—then shared use could be a priority.33 For instance, when Brazil was
developing the Carajás Railroad to transport ore from the Carajás deposit to the port in São Luis, the
national government had already had three decades of economic development plans for the region. 34
Accordingly, the railroad was designed to carry iron ore and general cargo, transport passengers, and
serve downstream industries.35 Also, the Simfer concession in Guinea explicitly details that the railroad
and port must be multi-user, with the infrastructure being made available to third-party users
transporting minerals or agricultural products,36 with access being dependent on several
preconditions.37
Even when a national government has a plan to develop a region, and shared-use mining infrastructure
can help address an infrastructure deficit, there will be little progress without a lead mining company
who is willing and able to build the infrastructure.38 Unfortunately, a lead mining company who is willing
to make an infrastructure investment based on the potential profitability of a mine will tend to prefer
to build exclusive, vertically-integrated infrastructure. The main driver of mining companies’ opposition
to shared use springs from their economic incentive to compete, not creating advantages for other
mines through a multi-user arrangement. In turn, multi-purpose arrangements such as the Carajás
corridor, which involve other types of bulk cargo, have a better track record of success.
Financiers of mining infrastructure also play a role in disincentivizing shared use, as they prefer the
predictability of a single user accessing the infrastructure. 39 In particular, shared-use rail and port
infrastructure is the hardest to finance because of the vertically integrated logistics chain between a
rail and port.40 Also, multi-user or multi-purpose infrastructure is inherently riskier than single-user
infrastructure because of the increased technical difficulties in operation, resulting in lower efficiency
and less profit.41 Secondary users who enter into long-term take-or-pay arrangements can reduce the
31
32
33
34
35
36

37
38

39
40
41

Toledano et al., Framework, 13.
Toledano et al., Framework, 6.
See Toledano et al., Framework, 13.
Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 75–76.
Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 76.
Republic of Guinea, “The Republic of Guinea and the Owner of the Infrastructures and the Holding of the Owner of the
Infrastructures and the Operator of the Infrastructures and Simfer S.A. and Rio Tinto Mining and Exploration Limited BOT Agreement Simandou Project,” “Entre La République de Guinee et le Proprietaire des Infrastructures et la Holding
du Proprietaire des Infrastructures et l’exploitant des Infrastructures et Simfer S.A. et Rio Tinto Mining and Exploration
Limited - Convention BOT Projet Simandou,” Article 14.1, (2014), https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf6237477089/view#/pdf [hereinafter Simandou Guinea Concession].
Simandou Guinea Concession, Art. 18.
See generally Toledano et al., Framework, 15 (explaining the potential stakeholders in mining operations and their
interests).
See Toledano et al., Framework, 16.
Toledano et al., Framework, 7.
Toledano et al., Framework, 16.
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hesitancy of financiers to support shared use infrastructure, 42 but it is not always clear who will, in fact,
take or pay, such as when other mining concessions are still in the exploration phase. Constructing
infrastructure with excess capacity without knowing who will use that capacity is a hard sell to financiers
because of the potential for wasted returns.43
Considering the weight of business interests that oppose shared-use mining infrastructure, national
governments have a key role in promoting shared use.44 However, shared use is a balancing act, and
governments need to consider both the benefits and downsides. Importantly, shared use is not
absolute and there are middle-ground options—such as “access holidays” that allow the mining
company to exclusively use a railroad and port for a defined time period related to profitability.45
Regardless of whether financial, social, or environmental considerations tip the scale toward requiring
that mining infrastructure be shared use during the contract period, governments should ensure that
contracts, at a minimum, contain a build-operate-transfer option, where ownership of the railway, port,
or power plant transfers back to the government after the expiration of the concession.46

3.2

Legal Approaches and Language for Statutes, Regulations, and Concessions

As outlined in Section 2, a constitution, statutes, regulations, and contracts create the legal framework
within which shared-use infrastructure is designed, constructed, and operated. The legal provisions
detailed below are divided by the subject area they concern, rather than by the type of legal instrument
in which they could or should be included. This organization allows for a more cohesive understanding
of how legal provisions can be shaped to facilitate shared use of railroads and ports.

3.2.1 Right-of-Way
A right-of-way legal provision functions as an easement allowing the government to retain access to,
and construct on, a mining company’s land.47 With a right-of-way, governments may build a road,
electric distribution lines, or install telecommunication equipment next to a railway.48 Installation of
infrastructure along a right-of-way next to an extant railway corridor costs “significantly less than
building it along a separate route” and “maximizes the use of existing land reserved for
transport/transmission infrastructure.”49 Even if there is little foreseen future economic development
along the railway corridor, the government should try and retain a right-of-way for public benefit.50
An example of a right-of-way provision can be found in the Cam Iron Mbalam concession in Cameroon.
Cameroon’s government retains the right to build on land within the concession area, but that right is
limited by the consent of the mining company which will be based on whether the proposed
construction will “likely” have a “material adverse effect” on the project’s operations:

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Toledano et al., Framework, 16.
Toledano et al., Framework, 16.
Toledano et al., Framework, 12.
See Toledano et al., Framework, 23.
Toledano et al., Framework, 8.
Toledano et al., Framework, 11.
Toledano et al., Framework, 23.
Toledano et al., Framework, 23.
See Toledano et al., Framework, 23.
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For the Term of the Project, the State agrees that if it builds or Grants to any Third Party a right
enabling the building of any road, right of way . . . it shall obtain the prior consent of the Project
Company . . . provided that any refusal to consent by such Project Company shall only be
motivated and reasoned to the extent that the grant of such rights is likely to have a Material
Adverse Effect on the Project Operations . . . any such material interference with Project
Operations may be deemed a Compensation Event . . . .51
If the company claims that there has been a material adverse effect resulting in a purported
compensation event related to third-party access—as defined by the concession—the dispute
resolution mechanisms of the concession kick in.52
In Liberia, the Mittal Steel Holding concession,53 the China Union concession,54 and the Western Cluster
concession55 contain similar language regarding the government’s ability to construct infrastructure on
the mining company’s land.

3.2.2 Excess Capacity
To facilitate shared-use access to rail and port infrastructure by the government or third parties, states
can require that the mining company allow others to access and use “excess capacity” of a particular
railway or port.56 Governments can also require that mining companies design, construct, or operate
railroads and ports to include excess capacity. 57 The legal provisions related to excess capacity for rail
and port infrastructure are very technical, with small nuances having large legal and financial
implications. For example, a railway or port that is designed to be expanded to transport goods in excess
of those contemplated by the mining company is very different than one designed and constructed
with excess capacity, or one designed, constructed, and operated with excess capacity.
Provisions regarding the permissible level of governmental or third-party “interference” with the
mining company’s operations also impact the possibility of shared use. Provisions requiring that thirdparty or governmental use not interfere with the mining company’s transport of ore, versus not
51

52
53

54

55

56
57

Republic of Cameroon, “The Republic of Cameroon Cam Iron S.A. Mbalam Convention,” Section 22.3, (2012),
https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-6424799341/view#/pdf [hereinafter Cam Iron Cameroon
Concession].
Cam Iron Cameroon Concession, Sections 1, 39.1, and 56.
Republic of Liberia, “An Act Ratifying the Amendment to the Mineral Development Agreement (MDA) Dated August 17,
2005 Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia (The Government) and Mittal Steel Holding A.G. and Mittal
Steel (Liberia) Holdings Limited (The Concessionaire),” (2007), 8, Article 7 . . . (5),
https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-9217575339/view#/pdf [hereinafter Mittal Steel Liberia
Concession]. The scan of this act/concession is damaged. The ellipses in further citations to the same document indicate
sub-headings that cannot be read. Page numbers are given to assist readers.
Republic of Liberia, “Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia, China-Union
(Hong Kong) Mining Co., Ltd. and China-Union Investment (Liberia) Bong Mines Co., Ltd,” Section 19.7(c), (2009),
https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-6387856838/view#/pdf [hereinafter China-Union Liberia
Concession].
Republic of Liberia, “An Act to Ratify the Concession Agreement among the Government of the Republic of Liberia,
Western Cluster Limited, Sesa Goa Limited, Bloom Fountain Limited, and Elenilto Minerals and Mining LLC.,” Section
19.8(c), (2011), https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-6207349867/view#/pdf [hereinafter Western
Cluster Liberia Concession].
China-Union Liberia Concession, Sections 6.7(i)-(ii).
Republic of Liberia, “Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia, Putu Iron
Ore Mining, Inc., and Mano River Iron Ore Ltd.” Sections 5.7(a)-(f), (2010), https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds591adf-4624088322/view#/pdf [hereinafter Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession].
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unreasonably interfere, versus not materially adversely affect, result in varied shared-use outcomes.
Ideally, concessions should outline objective indicators that allow interested parties—including
potential arbitrators or adjudicators—to identify what use constitutes a prohibited level of
interference. Concessions should also include information regarding which party bears the burden of
proof for identified claims. Objective indicators or criteria reduce the level of discretion ceded to
supervisory authorities tasked with resolving disputes related to shared use. They also reduce the room
for interpretation, which in turn reduces uncertainty in dispute settlement.
In Liberia, the Mittal Steel Holding concession details that the government can authorize third parties
to access excess capacity on the railroad and at the Buchanan Iron Ore port, provided that the mining
company confirms that excess capacity exists and that third-party use does not “unreasonably interfere
with the efficient and economic conduct of the operations.” 58 Technical and commercial terms for
access must accord with international industrial standards and be agreed to in good faith.59 The
government and Mittal Steel also agreed that they will enter into good-faith negotiations to establish a
formula to proportionally share the revenue from third-party use of the railroad or port.60 These
provisions outline how third-party access will function if there is extant capacity on the railway and at
the port. If Mittal Steel was operating both pieces of infrastructure at full capacity, third-party access
would not be permitted. That said, the concession also provides terms for how capacity might be
expanded.
If the government requests expansion of the railway or port, the mining company has the priority right
to construct excess capacity, with the terms of the expansion, again, being jointly agreed to by the
parties via good faith negotiations.61 If negotiations fail, the government, or authorized third parties,
retain the right to construct additional infrastructure to expand capacity, provided that the
construction, in the judgement of the mining company, does not unreasonably interfere with efficient
and economic conduct of their operations.62 If the parties are unable to come to an agreement
regarding if the construction of excess capacity will “unreasonably interfere” with the operations of
Mittal Steel, there is a dispute resolution process outlined in the concession.63 In short, shared use is
permitted if it does not “unreasonably interfere” with the operations of the mining company. 64 Notably,
Mittal Steel is not tasked with building a new railroad and port for the concession, but rather
rehabilitating a brownfield infrastructure that had become inoperable. 65 When greenfield
infrastructure is necessary, the legal provisions related to excess capacity contemplate additional
issues, such as design.
In Liberia, the Putu Iron Ore Mining Company concession provides for the construction of a railroad
from the mine to the port that will be able to transport “the maximum sustained output of Products
contemplated by the Feasibility Report,” and that the railroad will be “designed so that it can be
expanded on a commercially feasible basis to carry on a continuing basis twice as much traffic as is
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, 9, Article 7, . . . (d)(1).
Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, Article 7, . . . (2).
Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, Article 7, . . . (2).
Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, 10, Article 7, . . . (f).
Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, 10, Article 7, . . . (f).
Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, 10, Article 7, . . . (f).
Mittal Steel Liberia Concession, 9, Article 7, . . . (d)(1)-(5).
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contemplated by the preceding sentence.”66 Notably, the government or a third party may elect to
build the excess capacity at their own expense.67 Prior to the construction of excess capacity, if a third
party or the government wishes to pay to use the railroad to transport bulk cargo, such usage shall be
permitted,68 as long as such use does not “materially adversely affect the ability of the Company to
move Iron Ore to the Port or handle Iron Ore trains at the Port.” 69 This condition is a little stronger than
in the Rio Tinto concession in Pilbara, Australia, where third-party access was only permitted if it would
not unduly prejudice or interfere with the mining company’s operations. Overall, the challenge of
enforcing the shared use of integrated mining railways based on non-negative interference with mining
operations has not been overcome whether in Australia or Liberia.70 As detailed below, Brazil and
Cameroon present more promising examples.
To ensure excess capacity exists, governments may, for example, require that mining company
construct a railroad with double track. For instance, the Cam Iron concession in Cameroon states that
“the State may, in its sole discretion, elect by the Date of Entry into Force to fund the costs required to
build out the foundation for a dual track design” and that the “[s]tate shall be required to provide the
requisite funding.”71 Cam Iron retains the option to enter into negotiations with the government to
fund a portion of the dual track in exchange for additional capacity resulting from the expansion. 72 Dual
track designs are more operationally efficient and results in cost savings compared to two separate
single tracks.73 Notably, though, current technologies such as advanced control systems and
communications-based signaling may offer a more affordable way to deliver the required capacity by
allowing trains to run faster and closer in time than by doubling the tracks. 74 Before governments
allocate resources to expand capacity, they should, in concert with mining companies, assess all
available cost-effective solutions.
In Brazil, Vale recently opted for double-tracking the Carajás Railroad to transport the large amount of
additional ore being extracted from the S11D deposit. 75 Brazil’s renewal concession with Vale requires
that the Railroad Saturation Index of the Carajás Railroad remain below 90%. 76 If use rises to that level,
Vale must expand capacity to stay below the threshold.77
Once excess capacity is available, and a railroad becomes shared use, the mining company may want
to allow an independent party to take over operational responsibilities—a preference of subsequent
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Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(a).
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(a).
If the user pays for the necessary additional rolling stock and motive power. Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section
5.7(c).
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(c). If such use did materially adversely affect the mining company, the
government or third party requesting access would “bear the cost of the additional investment needed to enhance the
Railroad to avoid such material adverse effect.” Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(c).
Toledano, Rail & Port Policy Paper, 32.
Cam Iron Cameroon Concession, Section 11.3.
Cam Iron Cameroon Concession, Section 11.3.
Toledano et al., Framework, 28.
Tony Vidago, “How to Double Railway Capacity Without Building New Track,” Infrastructure Intelligence, June 11, 2014,
http://www.infrastructure-intelligence.com/article/jun-2014/how-double-railway-capacity-without-building-new-track.
Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 13.
Federative Republic of Brazil, “3rd Amendment to the Concession Contract of the Carajás Railroad,” “3 o Termo Aditivo ao
Contrato de Concessão da Estrada de Ferro Carajás” (2020), Annex 1, Appendix A, Section 4.2,
https://portal.antt.gov.br/documents/359178/3077d1e7-6e42-700f-0fc1-db674724fb97 [hereinafter Carajás Railroad
Concession Renewal] (free translation from Portuguese). See Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 83.
Carajás Railroad Concession Renewal, Annex 1, Appendix A, Section 4.2; Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 83.
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mining companies accessing the rail because it reduces the potential for discriminatory access fees. 78
The Western Cluster concession contemplates such a scenario:
If the Government or one or more third parties wish to use the Railroad to carry bulk cargo, the
Company may continue to operate the Railroad itself and carry out the operation of all trains
on the Railroad, or the Company may transfer operational responsibility for the Railroad to an
operating company owned by the Company and each other entity that has contributed to the
capital investment (exclusive of motive power and rolling stock) in the railway, and such
operating company may either operate the Railroad and all trains, or may be responsible solely
for the operation and maintenance of the fixed rail facilities and allow all persons that meet
non-discriminatory operating standards to operate their own bulk cargo trains on the fixed rail
facilities.79
For ports, excess capacity legal provisions focus more on the infrastructure itself, such as requiring the
design of separate terminals for general cargo and ore handling, 80 rather than the potential effects of
third parties on throughput. A small increase in a port’s traffic from shared use will not interfere with a
mining company’s operations.81 Traffic in a port is more flexible than traffic on a railway. That said,
shared use may require additional dredging, berths, storage facilities, or handling equipment 82 and an
explicit provision outlining how a port will be operated83 to support shared use is best.
The Putu Iron Ore Mining concession has several detailed provisions related to excess capacity at the
port. First, the concession requires that the port be designed and constructed to allow for twice as
much traffic as contemplated by the Development Plan, including “limited general petroleum handling,
and general cargo and container berthing spacing, as well as specialized bulk facilities required by the
Company’s business.”84 The company requires that it have “input over access to the commercial piers
to ensure non-interference with access to the Iron Ore jetty.” 85 Notably, third-party access to the
general cargo jetty is limited to one million tons per annum. 86 The lead mining company will provide
“general Port operation services” for third parties up to that million ton mark.87 To facilitate third-party
access at the port, the concession also outlines that the lead mining company will construct the
platforms for adequate warehousing related to general cargo transport. 88 For both the rail and port,
Putu Mining Company will approve the design and work plans, and operation of the infrastructure postexpansion, unless shared use would “unreasonably interfere with the Company’s operations.89
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See Toledano et al., Framework, 15.
Western Cluster Liberia Concession, Section 6.7(g).
Separate terminals may be needed to prevent contamination of goods or because the loading superstructure is
different. Toledano et al., Framework, 18.
Toledano et al., Framework, 19.
Toledano et al., Framework, 19.
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Expansion Capacity up to the Design Capacity; and (ii) incorporate technical aspects of the Mineral Terminal services
being provided to any party up to the Design Capacity.”).
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(e).
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, 5.7(g).
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, 5.7(g).
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, 5.7(f).
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3.2.3 Third-Party (Mineral and Bulk) Cargo and Dispute Resolution
Once excess capacity is available, the legal aspects of shared use are far from over. Many legal
provisions concern what type of goods can be transported on the infrastructure, at what cost, and how
to resolve disputes regarding shared use. By its nature, a railway–port system involves high fixed costs
and exhibits natural monopoly features.90 Lead mining companies—whether they share the railway
under a haulage system (rather rare) or under more common access regimes (where each third party
provides its own rolling stock)—want to fully recoup their substantial investment in the infrastructure.91
Those dynamics, coupled with the fact that the mining company may have contractual relationships
with clients to access the infrastructure, leads to a scenario where third-party users potentially face
discriminatory access and pricing. Governments therefore have a role to play in ensuring nondiscriminatory shared-use access through legal provisions in laws, regulations, and concessions.
Statutes are one legal method to guarantee non-discriminatory access. For instance, the Zambian
Public–Private Partnership Act of 2009 explicitly outlines that applicable concessions must detail how
the mining company will ensure “the provision of the service under essentially the same conditions for
all users” and “[non-discriminatory] access, as appropriate, of other service providers to any public
infrastructure network operated by the mining company.”92 Outside national laws, provisions in
concessions themselves frequently require non-discriminatory access.
The Western Cluster concession featured above details that the railroad operator—whether it be the
mining company or a third party—administer use of the railroad in such a way as to not “discriminate
against the shipments of any [p]erson.”93 Notably, this provision contemplates that the mining company
may transfer operational responsibility to a third party. 94 Here, third-party operation of the
infrastructure is optional, but the most effective mechanism for governments to ensure nondiscriminatory access is to require that ownership and operation of the rail and port infrastructure be
ceded to a third party.95 However, separating ownership and operation of the infrastructure can be
difficult because of the associated risk and higher interest rates demanded by infrastructure financiers,
which can make the project not bankable.96
In Brazil, the legal provision obligating Vale to provide non-discriminatory access requires the company
to provide “adequate service to users’ satisfaction, without any kind of discrimination and without
incurring in abuse of economic power, meeting the conditions of regularity, continuity, efficiency,
safety, timeliness, generality, and courtesy in its provision and affordability of freight rates and fares.”97
Vale (or its subsidiary) is “generally free” to negotiate the terms of access agreements for the Carajás
Railroad,98 but the Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres (ANTT) has significant, independent
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Toledano, Rail & Port Policy Paper, 7.
Infrastructure costs of third-party access will “largely depend on the commodity that the third party wants to transport.”
Toledano et al., Framework, 18. If third parties are transporting something other than minerals, such as timber or
agricultural products, different train wagons or loading and offloading facilities are required. Toledano et al., Framework,
18.
Republic of Zambia, “The Public-Private Partnership Act,” Section 52, 2009, https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-privatepartnership/sites/ppp.worldbank.org/files/ppp_testdumb/documents/zambia_ppp_act_2009.pdf.
Western Cluster Liberia Concession, Section 6.7(g).
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Toledano et al., Framework, 25.
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oversight over all land transportation in the state,99 including regulation of fees for third-party use of
railroads.100 The government, knowing that disputes may arise related to third-party access, even when
the mining company is required to not abuse its economic power, 101 included in the concession a
provision that states that “[t]he requirements that the Conceding Authority may make concerning the
clauses of such contracts related to the control of the abuse of economic power and the safety of rail
traffic shall be final.”102 Thus, there is an effective administrative mechanism to resolve disputes without
the need to seek arbitration or domestic courts.
In Liberia, the Putu Iron Ore concession outlines an alternate route to resolving disputes regarding thirdparty access. First, the concession requires the operating company to charge “commercially reasonable
rates”103 for access to the railway and that the railroad be operated in such a way that it does not
discriminate against any user.104 The concession then details a dispute resolution process related to the
transport of third-party and governmental bulk cargo.105 The dispute resolution process covers issues
such as user fees, interference with the mining company’s transport of goods, the design and
construction of expanded capacity for the railroad and port, and operation of the infrastructure. 106
Disputes that are not resolved within 60 days become a “senior management dispute,” with each party
then designating “a senior member of the management of its ultimate controlling entity to participate
in discussions to determine whether such dispute can be resolved.”107 If a resolution cannot be reached
within 105 days after the designation, a party to the dispute may demand that the dispute be submitted
to a “technical dispute resolution committee.”108 The mining company and the government, or a party
to the dispute, must each then designate two individuals to the committee, where one member of each
appointed team must have “experience in either railroad or port operations” and not have an interest
in the outcome of the dispute.109 The committee then selects an independent expert in the sector to
serve as chair.110 Recommendations of the committee regarding the dispute are binding, except if the
recommendations rests upon a determination of the legal meaning of any provision of the
concession.111 If it does, the mining company or government may seek arbitration under the terms of
the concession.112

3.2.4 Passenger Service and Non-Bulk Agricultural Cargo Services
Legal provisions related to passenger and agricultural cargo services on shared-use infrastructure are
often separate from those contemplating the transport of minerals or other bulk freight. For instance,
compared to bulk freight, passenger service on mining infrastructure generally demands 1) additional
safety standards and protocols, 2) more frequent stops along the line, and 3) higher rates of travel—all
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Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 4.
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Brauch et al., Carajás Report, 82.
Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(c).
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Putu Iron Ore Liberia Concession, Section 5.7(m).
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of which make management of the railroad more complicated. 113 In developing countries, government
intervention is key to ensuring passenger service on railways when user fees are generally not sufficient
to cover the additional infrastructure costs. 114 The majority of legal provisions related to passenger
service are concerned with access to the railroad, rather than the port, because passenger service at a
port is unlikely to interfere with the lead mining company’s operations. 115 For small agricultural cargo
services, negotiating parties should consider similar factors as they would for passengers. Doing so can
enable smallholder farmers to access the railroad.
While negotiating the Carajás Railroad concession in 1997, Brazil explicitly required that Vale “[ensure]
the provision of current passenger services, which may only be altered with the prior authorization of
the Conceding Authority.”116 In the Carajás Railroad renewal contract, legal provisions ensure that
passenger service not only continues, but expands: “[i]n the first 06 (six) years from the entry into force
of the 3rd Amendment, the Concessionaire [mining company] shall offer the same current frequency of
0.5 (half) pair of passenger trains per day on the network granted. In other years, it shall offer at least
01 (one) pair of passenger train per day.”117
Brazil’s ANTT has the ability to regulate fares for those passenger trains, 118 and legal provisions in the
concession reflect that supervisory authority. 119
In Guinea, the Simfer concession details that passenger service must be offered as an auxiliary service
to transporting ore for the founding customer. 120 Annex 10 includes many specific terms regarding
passenger service, including the number of stations (five) and the approximate number of users per
year the railroad will service (40,000). 121 Any proposed changes to passenger service requires the
consent of the government, the owner of the infrastructure, the operator of the infrastructure, and the
founding customer.122 Interestingly, the concession also provides that any extension of the railroad
infrastructure by the founding customer or third parties requires a corresponding increase in passenger
service.123
In Liberia, the Putu Iron Ore concession has a weaker provision regarding passenger service: “In
accordance with applicable Law and only with the Government’s prior approval, the Company may, but
is under no obligation to, make provision for additional passenger service . . . or to permit a third party
to operate passenger and non-bulk services on the Railroad.”124 Sierra Leone’s Model Mining
Development Agreement strikes a middle-ground where it does not explicitly require that mining
companies offer passenger service, but the company “shall, if and when reasonably requested by [the
Government of Sierra Leone], transport passengers . . . over the railway where it can do so without
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unduly prejudicing or interfering with its activities under this Agreement and subject to the payment to
it of commercially reasonable rates . . . .”125
Under certain conditions of volumes and viability, an open-access road along the railway corridor may
better serve passenger and small-cargo transportation needs. For example, while not providing for
passenger services on the railway, the Putu contract requires the mining company to “build a two-lane
paved all-weather road between Greenville and Zwedru for general public use with capacity for
handling heavy traffic,” and mandates the Ministry of Public works to “set forth the standards for the
design, construction and paving of the Road, which standards shall be consistent with International
Highway Standards.”126

4

Shared Use of Power Infrastructure

4.1

Context and Preconditions

Access to electricity is pivotal to mining operations. Mines depend on electricity to power mineral
processing equipment, housing for employees, communication technologies, safety equipment, and
even elevators and air pumps, if the mine is subsurface. Electricity costs can account for 10–25% of the
operating costs of a mine.127 States can capitalize on the opportunity afforded by a mining operation’s
demand for electricity to develop its own grid—expanding generation (preferably from renewable
sources),128 transmission and distribution systems, and access, while lowering cost.129
There are many methods to creating shared-use benefits in the generation and consumption of power.
Mines can produce and consume their own power, providing electricity to local communities through
a mini-grid system.130 Mines can produce their own power and sell excess to the national grid.131 Mines
can initially connect to the grid, but move to self-production when it becomes more economical, or
coordinate with other mines or large consumers to construct an off-site plant that powers multiple
operations.132 Mines can also work with governments to upgrade extant state-owned power assets, buy
power from independent power producers (IPPs), or source 100% of their power from the grid.133 All
of these modalities of power generation and consumption create opportunities for shared use because
of economies of scale and scope. Importantly, states need to create a regulatory system where shared-
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use benefits can materialize. “Coordination within the mining industry and between mining companies
and the government can result in significant economic gains.” 134
But before governments facilitate the construction and operation of shared-use power infrastructure,
“an important first step is to assess how mining companies are currently powering their operations,
and why they choose [a] particular arrangement.”135
Three general electricity-related considerations of a mining operation inform the development and
operation of shared-use infrastructure: power supply, reliability, and price.136 These aspects influence
where a mining operation sits on a spectrum of power generation and consumption—mines may be
completely self-sufficient, draw power exclusively from the national grid, or operate somewhere in the
middle.137 Where a mine sits on this spectrum then influences the strategies that governments can
deploy to facilitate shared use. For example:
•

If there is insufficient supply of electricity from the national grid or the cost of sourcing from the
grid is uncompetitive, the mine will self-generate its electricity. This scenario creates shared-use
benefits leveraging economies of scale, with the mine either selling excess power to the grid or
serving as anchor demand for an IPP.138

•

If the grid power is cost effective, but the transmission network is unreliable or does not extend to
the mine, the mine might have to work with the government to improve transmission or
distribution lines. Shared-use benefits will arise when the government might request that the new
lines also service a previously unconnected town and credit the mining company for the connection
via a reduced electricity rate or another commercial arrangement.139

4.2

The Role of Government

How a government regulates the power sector—and occasionally participates in it via state-owned
companies—is a major factor influencing the supply, reliability, and price of electricity for a mining
operation and the potential for shared use. Until recently, vertically integrated state-owned utilities
monopolized the power sectors of many countries, especially in Africa. 140 To incentivize investment,
many developing and emerging countries reformed the power sector by “[unbundling] the natural
monopoly activities (transmission, distribution) from the competitive ones (generation, trading,
supply)” and created “competitive wholesale and/or retail market[s].” 141 In Africa, bundled utilities are
still far more prevalent and many state-owned companies still participate in the power sector.142 In
turn, an independent regulator is key to private entities—such as mining companies or IPPs—investing
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in infrastructure that facilitates shared use.143 An independent regulator can control tariffs and access
charges to ensure power sales by private parties are on equal footing with those of state-owned
companies.144
To further facilitate shared use, governments can also institute a regulatory framework that allows for
long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs). PPAs are key to mines or other IPPs securing reasonable
financing for the construction of shared-use power infrastructure.145 If a mine is constructing a power
plant for its own operations, but is required to generate excess capacity for sale to the government or
other third parties, the mining company and its financiers will be looking to have off-takers commit to
“buying a minimum amount of capacity from the owner over a longer period.” 146 Also, when the state
utility is acting as the off-taker, the IPP and its financiers will want to be sufficiently certain that the
utility will be able to distribute the power and collect payment, often requiring sovereign guarantees. 147
Notably, the utility can lessen its exposure and support shared-use by being a member of a power pool,
creating an outlet for excess capacity if local issues arise.148

4.3

Legal Approaches and Language for Statutes, Regulations, and Concessions

Because shared-use infrastructure for power is highly dependent on the legal and regulatory framework
of the electricity sector in a particular jurisdiction, the legal provisions detailed below are organized by
jurisdiction, rather than by topic.

Cameroon
In Cameroon, the Cam Iron concession contemplates a variety of methods that the mining company
might access the electricity necessary to power its operations. The methods described are
representative of the basic means through which power can be generated and consumed in a
sufficiently liberalized power sector, illustrating that opportunities for shared-use outcomes are more
prevalent when IPPs and PPAs are allowed. The concession also creates a framework where the state
can leverage the captured demand of Cam Iron to potentially develop a shared-use power plant.
First, the concession explicitly outlines that, “[t]he Parties acknowledge that the conduct of the Project
shall require a reliable supply of power to the Project Facilities for the industrial and human purposes
of the Project,”149 and that the available power generation options are “[a]ccording to the needs
specified by the relevant Project Company and to the power resources available in the relevant Project
Area.”150 The concession then outlines three options for accessing electricity: purchase from a domestic
utility, self-production, or purchase from an IPP.151 Notably, if Cam Iron self-generates, the concession
outlines that the company is permitted to enter into a long-term power supply agreement with “such
entity in charge of supplying power in the territory of the State,” i.e., the utility, ensuring Cam Iron’s
143
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charges permit it to “[achieve] an appropriate return on the additional capital it is required to spend in
order to produce the surplus power. . . .”152
Notwithstanding the three options, if the state decides to construct a power plant for supply of power
to the mining operation, Cam Iron and other project companies undertake to enter into take-or-pay
PPAs based on “mutually agreeable terms consistent with practices applicable to international power
production and generation plants managed by the private sector.” 153 This clause requires Cam Iron to
purchase power from a plant built by the government, but the plant’s financing is likely dependent on
there being an extant, mutually-agreed-upon PPA with Cam Iron, the anchor client. Because the
provision does not call for the power plant to be exclusively constructed for the mining company,
Cameroon may be able to leverage the demand of the mining operation to build a state-owned plant
that can supply power to both the mining company and third parties.

Liberia
If the circumstances are such that a mining operation is generating its own electricity, 154 states may
require that the company produce excess power for shared use. The excess power may be sold or
distributed for free to a local community, sold to a public utility, or sold to other mining operations.
For instance, the Western Cluster concession in Liberia requires that:
[I]n the event the Company constructs a Power Plant at any of its mining sites, such Power Plant
shall be designed to generate a quantity of electric energy in excess of the electric energy
required by the Company for Operations to supply third party users located within a 10 km
radius thereof on a 7 days per week, 24 hours per days basis in accordance with third party user
demand from time to time . . . 155
Power generation for third parties is capped: “the Company shall not be required to build a Power Plant
in a manner that it generates an excess of more than 10% over the electric energy required by it for
Operations.”156 After the mining company generates excess power, interconnection and distribution to
third parties is done on governmental infrastructure, i.e., power distribution by the mining company
stops “at the gates” of the power plant. 157 Also, the power plant must be designed and constructed in
such a way that it can be “expanded on a commercially feasible basis to have twice the electricity
generating capacity necessary to service Operations.”158 Interestingly, the concession also requires that
the company account in a feasibility report for a potential scenario where the mining company does
not construct its own power plant, but connects to the national grid, 159 anchoring demand for power
generated by a hydroelectric dam. This provision allows the government to leverage Western Cluster’s
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current demand for power to determine the viability of grid connection for both this and future mining
operations.
The legal provisions related to power in the China-Union concession are quite different. The concession
first outlines three methods through which the mining company may “provide for the installation of
electric generating capacity to meet its reasonable needs for conducting Operations in Liberia.” 160 Then,
if the mining company produces excess electricity, it must first try and sell the excess to the
government, and if the government declines, to third parties. 161 In each case, the mining company’s
prices are limited to the cost of production plus a “reasonable profit margin,” agreed to by the mining
company and the government.162 This kind of provision does not produce shared-use effects if the
company is not required to generate excess electricity in the first place, which is the case for ChinaUnion.

Papua New Guinea
In Papua New Guinea, the Standard Mining Development Contract contemplates two instances where
excess power can be generated and sold to the government. If:
(a) the Approved Proposals for Development provides for the Project electric power supply
facilities to generate electric power in excess of the Project’s needs in order to meet local rural
requirement; or (b) subsequent to the Approved Proposals for Development, the Company
(Joint Venturers) decides (decide) that the Project electric power supply capacity exceeds the
needs of the Project at any time . . . the Company (Joint Venturers) shall sell to the appropriate
governmental agency such excess electricity produced by the facilities for resale and
distribution to rural electrical loads.163
In both instances, the Electricity Commission needs to make an order permitting the sale of electricity
to “other users,” but the concession provides that government is the only eligible purchaser. 164 Notably,
“[the mining company] shall under no circumstances be required to increase the capacity of its electric
power supply facilities or transmission facilities beyond that required by the Approved Proposals for
Development to meet the needs of any other users or to construct or maintain any off-site grid or
distribution system.”165 This freezing clause explicitly outlines that future laws or regulations that might
require the power plant to be expanded are not applicable to this operation.

160
161
162
163
164
165

China-Union Liberia Concession, Section 19.3(a).
China-Union Liberia Concession, Section 19.3(b).
China-Union Liberia Concession, Section 19.3(b).
Papua New Guinea Standard Mining Concession, Section 5.7.
Papua New Guinea Standard Mining Concession, Section 5.7.
Papua New Guinea Standard Mining Concession, Section 5.7.
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5

Conclusion and Further Research

As outlined in the introduction, this paper sheds light on legal provisions that underpin shared-use
mining infrastructure and provides non-exhaustive guidance on how governments and the private
sector might strengthen legal language that advances shared use of railroads, ports, and power. The
provisions detailed were selected because of (1) the availability of primary-source legal language, (2)
the value of the provisions in illustrating various forms of shared use, and (3) the specific language
deployed by the drafters to encourage or require and regulate shared use.
Further research could examine the long-term effectiveness of the provisions in practice, including how
provisions have fared when challenged by an opposing party in the crucible of courts, arbitration, or
administrative proceedings. Such work was beyond the scope of this project but would result in
recommendations on how language can be drafted to ensure shared-use outcomes are not just a goal
of a legal provision, but a tenable outcome.
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